Category: Other issues

Courts and Tribunals Bill Committee Stage Day 1

Published on by jonesjb

I said at Second Reading that I was going to oppose a lot of the clauses in the Bill, and I will be standing up several times today to do exactly that. The first clause I oppose is Clause 1, and I find myself signing up to do so with some unusual colleagues—which is obviously a pleasure. I am against this clause because the Government, in order to make the court system easier to manage, are taking away an important protection from people accused of criminal offences. If we cannot get rid of the first clause, I support the other amendments in this group.

The right to elect trial by jury is an important safeguard. This clause removes that choice and hands the decision to magistrates. I have great respect formagistrates—I know quite a few and I appreciate the work they do—but that is not the issue here. The issue is whether a defendant should lose the choice of having their case heard by a jury. The Government argue that this is necessary to tackle the Crown Court backlog, but as we have already heard, removing rights is not a substitute for properly resourcing our courts. It is not going to work; that is fairly obvious from the debates we have had already.

The Bar Council strongly opposes this provision. It warns that the changes will result in more serious and complex cases being heard in magistrates’ courts, which is fairly obvious. But that concern becomes even greater when we consider Clause 5, which I will also be opposing and which increases magistrates’ sentencing powers. Taken together, these provisions mean that more serious cases can be dealt with in magistrates’ courts, with greater powers to deprive defendants of their liberty.

There is also the equality consideration, which I am disappointed that the Government have refused to address so far. Their own equality statement acknowledges that Black defendants, older defendants and women are more likely to elect for a Crown Court trial. In 2022, 26% of Black defendants elected for a Crown Court trial, compared with 15% of white defendants. The Lammy Review found that many people from ethnic-minority backgrounds had

“more confidence in the fairness of juries than … in the fairness of Magistrates’ Courts”.

So removing this choice risks further undermining confidence in a justice system where trust is already quite fragile.

There are consequences for witnesses and complainants too. Section 28 special measures, which allow eligible witnesses to have their cross-examination pre-recorded, is not available in magistrates’ courts. This is particularly important for children, people with certain disabilities, and complainants of sexual offences. With the current spotlight in our country on sexual offences and the fact that women find it incredibly difficult to get justice, this is quite an important component.

The Government acknowledge that there is insufficient data to establish how many vulnerable witnesses could be affected. How can we press ahead with something when we do not even have the data to see whether it is going to be good or bad? I do not understand. The organisation Justice also supports removing the clause.

A fair trial should not depend on whether the Government want to move one backlog to another. The right to a jury trial should not be treated as expendable and Greens such as me will always defend it.

I rise to speak to the remaining amendments in this group. Amendments 8, 67 and 75 essentially agree with the points made by Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. I draw the Government’s attention to their own equalities statement. It says that

“if more cases are dealt with in the magistrates’ courts, it is likely that an increased proportion of these defendants may be ineligible for legal aid when they would otherwise have been eligible if their case had been heard at the Crown Court”.

That is a pretty big admission, and I think it is something that we have to take into account. I hope that the Government will remember their own words, because it means that they are well aware that their reforms will mean more people going through the courts without a lawyer.

Many of us raised this at Second Reading. The income threshold for criminal legal aid in the magistrates’ court is much lower than in the Crown Court. As Justice points out, someone working full time on the minimum wage will not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates’ court. So the Government are moving more cases into a court where fewer people qualify for legal aid. They know this will happen. It says so in their own assessment.

Justice also points to research by Transform Justice, showing what happens when defendants have to represent themselves. They may not understand the charges, they enter the wrong plea, they struggle to question witnesses or fail to put forward information that could reduce their sentence. The consequences become even more serious when the Bill increases magistrates’ sentencing powers to two years in prison. Someone could face a substantial prison sentence without having had access to a publicly funded lawyer.

Victims can also be affected. In some cases, including assault cases, defendants are allowed to cross-examine witnesses themselves. More unrepresented defendants could mean more victims having to face questioning by the person accused of the offence. The Institute for Government has warned that unrepresented defendants can make hearings longer and more complicated. That does not sound like any sort of efficiency saving that the Government are hoping to achieve.

At Second Reading, the Minister acknowledged these concerns, and the Government’s answer was that they would look at the new income thresholds after the reforms had been implemented, depending on funding and operational considerations. I want to make sure that they are addressed before these huge changes come into effect. The Government know there is a problem; they know that more defendants will be in the magistrates’ courts, where the legal aid threshold is much lower, but they want to press ahead with the court reforms and leave the question of whether people can afford legal representation until afterwards.

Lord Leveson, and the Justice Committee have recommended increasing the income thresholds. My amendment, supported by Justice, would make sure that the financial eligibility criteria in the magistrates’ courts are brought into line with those in the Crown Court before the relevant provisions come into force. People should not lose access to legal representation simply because their case is now being heard in a different court. The Government should get this right before they bring in the reforms and not wait until people have already suffered the consequences.

I oppose Clause 3. I am particularly concerned that the Government are presenting it as a practical measure to tackle delays when the evidence suggests that it will make very little difference. The Government’s own impact assessment estimates that these provisions will save just 200 Crown Court sitting days a year—around 0.18% of current Crown Court capacity. That is a tiny return for such a huge change to the way that criminal justice is delivered.

There is also no good reason to assume that removing juries will necessarily make these trials shorter. Judges sitting alone will still have to consider the evidence and, in complex fraud cases, they may have to produce lengthy reasoned arguments. Juries also provide an incentive to keep trials properly focused and evidence clearly presented. Fraud cases often turn on questions of fact, including whether someone acted dishonestly, and juries are well placed to judge dishonesty. The independent review by Jonathan Fisher KC found that juries can deal with complex fraud cases when trials are properly managed and presented. He warned that removing juries from serious fraud trials would send the wrong message about the seriousness of fraudulent misconduct.

There is something else in this clause that really concerns me, which is the power of the Secretary of State to add further offences to the list. In your Lordships’ House we get a little fed up with statutory instruments that bring in more and more power to a Bill that we have already passed. Although these initial provisions cover financial crime and related offences, the scope can be widened through secondary legislation. It is a very real risk that restrictions on jury trial will extend beyond the cases the Government are currently talking about. Jury trial is not an obstacle to be removed whenever a case becomes difficult or lengthy. It is an important protection against the concentration of judicial power and a vital part of public participation in the justice system.

Hansard record here: Courts and Tribunals Bill – Hansard – UK Parliament

I oppose Clause 5. It will allow the Government to increase the maximum custodial sentence that magistrates can impose from 12 months to 18 or 24 months. As we have heard, it will also give the Secretary of State the power to make that change through regulations rather than through Parliament, which would allow us to consider the matter through primary legislation. My concern is about not just the length of sentences but the combined effect of this clause and Clause 1. The Bar Council has warned that this is a “dangerous experiment”, particularly at a time when prisons are already at capacity and the backlog in magistrates’ courts is growing. Increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers does not address the underlying problems of an under-resourced justice system.

Like many other Lords, I am also concerned about the delegated powers in this clause. The House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has specifically recommended that Clause 5(1) be removed. Its chair warned that the clause oversteps the proper limits of ministerial discretion. We should not hand the Government such a significant power to change sentencing limits without proper parliamentary scrutiny. The Government have not made a convincing case for this change. If they think magistrates should have greater sentencing powers, why will they not justify that proposal to Parliament instead of leaving the decision to future regulations? I told the Minister that I would not say this, but, while he is extremely emollient in trying to calm our fears, I am afraid he has not done so. The Government are faced with opposition from all around the Chamber. The Greens are linking with the Conservatives, Labour and the Lib Dems. Might that give the Government pause to think that perhaps they have got it wrong?

Amendment 35 and my consequential Amendments 58, 70 and 71 would replace Clause 5 with a single, simple provision. It removes the Henry VIII power of the Secretary of State to change by regulations how long a magistrates’ court can send someone to prison for, for an “either way” offence. At Second Reading, I said that I could not support expanding magistrates’ sentencing powers. This amendment offers the Government a constructive alternative, taken directly from the review on which this Bill is built.

Paragraph 14A of Schedule 23 to the Sentencing Act 2020 is a Henry VIII power. It allows a Minister to rewrite an Act of Parliament by statutory instrument, subject only to a negative procedure. That is appalling. We are not a democracy when that sort of action gets taken. Since 2022, the limit has been raised from six to 12 months, cut back to six months in March 2023 and raised to 12 months again in November 2024. That is three changes in under three years, driven by Crown Court backlogs one year and prison capacity the next. Clause 5 widens this even further. It allows the Secretary of State to set the limit at 18 or 24 months, up to double today’s maximum—again, by regulations.

The Minister told your Lordships’ House at Second Reading that the Government intend to raise the limit to 18 months next year, depending on Royal Assent. That is not what Lord Leveson, recommended. In recommendation 15 of Part 1 of his independent review of the criminal courts, he recommended that the power to change magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument be repealed and that the 12-month maximum should be made permanent. My amendment, therefore, does exactly what recommendation 15 asks.

I absolutely despair of this Government, in the sense that they seem to be backtracking on all the democratic ideas they had when they were in Opposition. I sat here and listened to all the colleagues here on the Labour Benches when they were in Opposition, saying wonderful things that I could agree with. Now, I just see the other Tory party sitting over there. It is very depressing to sit over here these days.

Hansard record here: Courts and Tribunals Bill – Hansard – UK Parliament

Palestine Action arrests outside Supreme Court

Published on by jonesjb

I wrote to the Metropolitan Police Commission last week saying:

Dear Commissioner

As you will know, yesterday (3rd November), around twenty-five campaigners were arrested outside the Supreme Court for holding up signs using the same or similar words said by Sarah Helm, the wife of the government’s National Security Adviser, who had posted on X “God help us authors who support Palestine and Palestine Action.” Her words were widely reported in the media with the police stating it “does not meet criminal threshold.” This seems common sense advice and I commend the police for taking no action. However, it is very confusing for members of the public when they are subsequently arrested for holding up signs using similar language, such as “God help us normal people who support Palestine and Palestine Action.”

I am concerned about reputational damage being suffered by the Met Police as a result of the arrests of those supporting Palestine Action.

There appears to be a lack of clarity about what is and isn’t support for this proscribed organisation.

I did oppose the proscription of Palestine Action with an unsuccessful Fatal Motion in the Lords and worry it is damaging both the public’s support for anti-terrorism laws and the police’s enforcement of them. The proscription of PA has led to over four thousand people being arrested for completely non-violent protests, such as sitting silently while holding up a placard. It has diverted police resources, clogged up the courts and could result in further over-crowding of prisons. Given the nature of the crimes committed by those on early release, as a result of over-crowding, it does feel like the police and the Govt have got all their priorities wrong.

It has also resulted in a great deal of confusion about what does and doesn’t constitute terrorism.

After twelve years on the Metropolitan Police Authority, I felt I had a good understanding of the serious nature of dealing with terrorist threats, but the proscription of Palestine Action has overextended the definition and a large section of public opinion does not agree with it. There are examples of the police ignoring a protest in one part of the country, but making arrests for exactly the same form of protest in another area. A form of words on a placard my get a person arrested on one day, but fail to get a reaction from the police on another.

The police clearly have a large degree of operational discretion in how they apply the rules on the proscription of Palestine Action and I therefore urge you to focus the Met’s scarce resources on the public’s priority of dealing with violent and serious crimes.

Yours jj

Health Bill Committee Stage Day 1

Published on by jonesjb

Clause 4: Reducing inequalities

Amendment 6 moved by Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

6: Clause 4, page 3, leave out lines 22 to 29 and insert—

“1C Duty to improve public health and reduce health inequalities(1) The Secretary of State must, in exercising functions in relation to the health service—(a) take all reasonable steps to improve the health of the people of England and prevent illness,(b) reduce health inequalities between the people of England,(c) take all reasonable steps to reduce inequalities in the ability to access health services and in the outcomes achieved through the provision of health services, and(d) address the social, economic and environmental determinants of health, including in relation to housing, education, employment, income and environmental conditions.(2) In discharging the duties under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must take account of the need to prevent ill health by addressing its causes, as well as by providing services for the treatment of illness.”

Member’s explanatory statement: This amendment strengthens the Secretary of State’s duties to improve public health and reduce health inequalities, including by addressing the social, economic and environmental determinants of health and preventing illness rather than relying on treatment alone.

Filling in for Natalie on day 1 of Committee Stage: I will speak to the four amendments in this group that are in the name of Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. I shall speak also on behalf of Lady Whitaker, who is ill and unable to be here. She asked me particularly to mention that she supports Amendments 15, 16 and 17 in this group, on inequalities.

On Amendment 6, a duty of “must have regard to”, as is currently in Clause 4, is not much of a duty. We can have regard to many things, but it does not mean that we will do anything about them. I support the amendments in this group that want to strengthen that duty to something where we can see some action. The aim of this amendment is to strengthen it further and to put improving public health, reducing inequalities and addressing the social, economic and environmental determinants of health into the Secretary of State’s statutory responsibilities.

We talk a great deal about the pressure on the NHS. We talk about waiting lists, hospital capacity, workforce shortages and the money needed keep services going. These are all extremely important, but we need to ask some more fundamental questions. Why are so many people becoming ill in the first place, and why are some people so much more likely to become ill than others? As the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, said on an earlier group, we need to shift our focus from treating sickness to creating health. Health is not simply a matter of what happens when somebody walks into a GP’s surgery or a hospital. It is shaped by conditions in which people are born, grow up, work and live. It is shaped by whether somebody has a secure home, a decent income, good food, good education, safe working conditions and clean air to breathe.

These things should make up a health policy. A person living in a cold, damp home, especially near a busy road, as so many people do here in London, is more likely to suffer from respiratory problems. Someone who cannot afford nutritious food faces consequences for their lifelong health. A child growing up in poverty can face disadvantages that will affect their health for the rest of their lives. This amendment takes all that into account and would require the Secretary of State to take reasonable steps to do something about it, because here in the UK, those in the most deprived areas can expect to live almost 20 healthy years fewer than those in the least deprived areas. That is a staggering statistic.

Prevention will not eliminate the need for hospitals, medicines or specialist care, but a health service should not focus just on what happens after people become ill. Prevention means more than telling people to make healthier choices. It means making those choices possible. It means tackling food poverty and ensuring that people can afford nutritious food. It looks like investing in public health and early intervention. There is not much point in treating the consequences of poverty without addressing the circumstances that make people ill.

What is the point of treating respiratory disease while allowing people to live in damp homes or to breathe polluted air? Human health and the health of the natural world are connected. Cleaner air and water, access to nature, healthier food systems and action to protect us from the effects of the climate crisis are all public health measures. As we know, the benefits of a healthy environment are not shared equally. People on lower incomes are often least able to move away from pollution, poor housing and unhealthy surroundings. The inequalities that we see in health are therefore connected to inequalities in wealth, power and the quality of places where people live. Lady Nargund, also spoke about inequalities, a primary pressure on our beloved NHS.

The gap in healthy life expectancy between the most and least advantaged communities is a measure of inequality that the Government should actively try to reduce. A statutory duty will not by itself remove these inequalities, but the wording of a Bill does matter. It establishes what the Government are required to do rather than merely saying what they would like to do.

Amendments 15, 16 and 17 aim to strengthen the provisions in Clause 4 for all communities facing health inequalities. These amendments address three essential requirements—visibility in health data, recognition in decision-making and accountability for progress. For example, Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities experience some of the most severe and persistent health inequalities in England. They face poorer physical and mental health, barriers to accessing healthcare and discrimination within healthcare settings. The 2021 census found that Gypsy or Irish Traveller people were more than twice as likely to report bad health or very bad health as the rest of the population of England and Wales overall—12.5% compared with 5.2%.

Nearly one in six reported being disabled and limited “a lot” in their daily activities by long-term physical or mental health conditions, compared with around one in 13 of the overall population. Research has found that Gypsy or Irish Traveller women in England and Wales are twice as likely to die by suicide as those in the white British women category. Yet a 2020 review by Friends, Families and Travellers found that of 79 local suicide prevention plans covering 113 areas in England, only five mentioned Gypsy and Traveller communities, and only two included action to address suicide inequalities.

Therefore, despite the inequalities in health outcomes, the communities’ needs are not being consistently identified in national health data or adequately reflected in the planning and delivery of services. Collecting properly disaggregated ethnicity data is essential. Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller communities are not a single homogenous group, and grouping them together under one category can obscure important differences in their health experiences and outcomes. Data should enable us to understand the distinct experiences of Gypsy, Roma, Irish Traveller and other communities, rather than masking inequalities within broad categories.

More broadly, the same challenges affect other inclusion health groups, including people experiencing homelessness, vulnerable migrants, people in contact with the criminal justice system, and victims of modern slavery. These groups often experience overlapping disadvantages, social exclusion and barriers to healthcare. Clause 4 provides an important opportunity to address these inequalities but, as it stands, a general duty to “have regard to” reducing inequalities and access to health services and health outcomes will not, by itself, ensure that the people experiencing the greatest inequalities are identified, considered and supported. These amendments would help make that duty effective in practice.

Amendment 15 would require national health data systems to collect, analyse and publish data sufficient to identify and monitor these inequalities. Amendment 16 would ensure that the particular barriers facing inclusion health groups are considered when the Secretary of State exercises the health inequalities duty. Amendment 17 would require annual reporting on progress, including action taken in relation to Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller communities—this is essential for transparency and accountability. These amendments are all complementary. They would help ensure that inclusion health groups are visible in the evidence used to make decisions. They build on existing commitments to reduce health inequalities, and they aim to ensure that the system we have is better able to recognise and respond to the needs of these communities. I beg to move.

I closed the debate saying:

I thank the Minister for her replies; I really admire the positivity in there. I have been using the NHS since 1949, and it is absolutely amazing. My working-class parents were incredibly delighted by its introduction, but I rather suspect that my age cohort has had the best of it—I hope that that is not true. I would love to respond to a lot of the points, including on coastal communities, which often suffer from huge environmental pollution in rivers, along seashores and so on. This has been a fascinating debate, and I can see an exciting Report stage in the offing. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

Courts and Tribunals Bill Second Reading

Published on by jonesjb

I always love following Lord Carlile, and hearing about his exploits. The story about judges’ acquittal rates is perhaps because they are deeply misogynistic—but I do not know. At the start Lord Ashcombe, talked about there being a lot of great legal minds in the Chamber. I am sure there are, but clearly I am not one of them. However, I have quite a strong sense of fairness and justice, and therefore some concerns about the Bill. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Stace, for not hearing his maiden speech, but I promise to read it in Hansard and give him feedback tomorrow. I am sure he would love to hear it.

I move to the Bill. Nobody disputes that 14 years of Conservative underfunding have left our Crown Courts with an appalling backlog and that victims are paying the price. The Government say that they want to get justice moving; of course I support that, but I would like to see a fix for the problems that stop courts hearing cases. The Bill is moving around who gets to hear them and taking away some of the safeguards that protect defendants. I feel that is the wrong approach. The Government have rightly dropped their proposal to remove jury trials for less serious cases in the Crown Court, but keeping thousands of cases in magistrates’ courts, without a choice, is still a restriction on jury trials, and the Government have still not shown that they will solve the backlog.

We need to ask a simple question: why are cases not getting to court on time and what would make a difference? The Government expect their proposals to move about 25,000 cases a year away from the Crown Court, but where are those cases going? The court system already has a huge backlog, fewer magistrates than it had a decade ago and shortages of legal advisers. The organisation Justice has warned that there is insufficient evidence that magistrates’ courts can cope with this extra work, so why are the Government pressing ahead? Moving cases between courts does not make the problems disappear, and removing some of the right to jury trials does not magically make a case straightforward or ensure that a hearing can go ahead.

The Government’s proposals also risk leaving more defendants without legal aid. People who might have had a lawyer in the Crown Court could end up representing themselves in the magistrates’ courts, even when they face the possibility of prison. That is massively unfair. It can also mean longer, more complicated hearings, and the accused cross-examining victims on cases such as assault. The Government are chasing efficiency savings in the wrong places while risking changes that could undermine them and our justice system.

On the right of appeal, Justice has highlighted how often appeals against magistrates’ decisions succeed. These appeals are a safeguard against wrongful convictions and wrong sentences. Making people seek permission to appeal, often without a lawyer to help them, risks shutting people out of justice.

If there is a risk that these changes will make an already difficult experience of the justice system even worse for people who are vulnerable or marginalised, we should examine that properly before going ahead. You cannot always put things right after someone has been denied a fair hearing.

What about the age and background of magistrates and who is able to volunteer during the week? The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, explained this very clearly. If the Government are serious about clearing the backlog, they need to deal with what is actually going wrong. Trials are delayed because witnesses are unavailable, defendants are not brought to court, and court buildings and technology need investment. There are shortages across the criminal legal workforce, and legal aid must be sufficient to ensure that people can get proper representation. These problems are not solved by taking away a jury or making an appeal harder; they are solved by making sure that hearings go ahead, that courts have the staff and facilities they need, and that cases are properly prepared. Not much of that is in the Bill.

I support the new measures for witnesses, but I cannot support provisions that remove the right to elect a jury trial, restrict the right of appeal and expand magistrates’ sentencing powers. I also cannot support the measure in the Bill to allow the Secretary of State to add further offences to the list for judge-only trials through secondary legislation. That means that a future Government could extend the restriction on jury trials even more, without having to bring forward primary legislation for Parliament to debate.

I will press the Government to explain how they intend to address the real causes of delay and to provide a properly funded plan for courts expected to take on more work. They were right to rethink that part of the Bill, but they should now look again at the rest.

I am also worried about the bigger picture here. I did not expect to spend my time having to fight to defend basic civil liberties against this Government, but here we are, arguing about jury trials while the Government expand curbs to protesting, facial recognition surveillance and restrictions on people seeking asylum. Taken together, they give the state more power over people and take away some of the safeguards that are supposed to protect us from the misuse of power. It is often minorities, protesters and people who challenge those in authority who are most exposed to those consequences. We have only just repealed the Vagrancy Act 1824, which grouped the poor and the homeless together with criminals. That is how we saw them then. I dread the justice system getting harder for people to access and harder on the people who need to access it.

Hansard record here: Courts and Tribunals Bill – Hansard – UK Parliament

Thames Water

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I intervened in this debate on drought to say: Thames Water, which I am a customer of, will run out of money within the next few weeks. Eighteen months ago it was given £3 billion to keep going and now it is asking for a further £2.4 billion. Why on earth is Thames Water not in special administration already?

Baroness Hayman of Ullock replied for HMG: The simple answer to that is that the rules for special administration make it quite difficult for the Government to put Thames Water into special administration while it is still financing itself. I know the noble Baroness is saying that it is about to run out of money, but on paper and in its finances, it is continuing to operate as a company and to provide water. The question is: how long are the Government prepared to accept the current situation? That is something we are looking at.

Link to debate here: Drought: Impact and Policies – Hansard – UK Parliament

Railways Bill Committee Stage Day 4

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Natalie stepped in to cover the first part of the debate clashed with the Public Accountability Bill debate…

Amendment 114A moved by Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle

Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle

114A: After Clause 17, insert the following new Clause—

“Passenger modal shift target(1) The Secretary of State must, after consulting the Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Ministers, set and publish a target, specifying a date by which it is to be achieved, to increase the overall distance travelled by passengers by railway.(2) In setting the target, the Secretary of State must have particular regard to—(a) increasing the distance travelled by passengers by railway relative to travel by private car and domestic air services, and(b) increasing the distance travelled by passengers by railway where railway travel forms part of a journey involving active travel, bus, tram, metro, coach, ferry or other public transport services.(3) The Secretary of State must, in respect of each year, prepare, lay before Parliament and publish a report setting out progress towards meeting the target, the steps taken to meet it and the steps proposed to be taken in the following year.(4) The Secretary of State must review the target at least once in every period of five years.

(5) The Secretary of State may revise or replace the target only if the revised or replacement target is no less ambitious than the target it revises or replaces.(6) Before revising or replacing the target, the Secretary of State must consult the Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Ministers.(7) Great British Railways must, when exercising its statutory functions, have regard to the target set by the Secretary of State under this section.”

Member’s explanatory statement: This amendment requires the Secretary of State to set a target to increase the distance travelled by passengers by railway.

Natalie’s speech: Lords, observant noble Lords will have noticed that I am not my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. She apologises that she is currently occupied in the Chamber with the Public Office (Accountability) Bill, although I hope she will rejoin the Committee shortly. My qualifications for taking part in this Committee are that, over 14 years, I have travelled an enormous number of train miles across these islands and I am passionate about greatly improving the reliability, affordability and practicality of train travel. I just looked at my diary and, in the next 10 days, I have journeys to Kidderminster, Manningtree, Sheffield and Manchester. I have my fingers crossed.

In moving Amendment 114A, I will speak primarily to all the other amendments in this rather diverse group, described as “general duties”. I briefly express sympathy with Amendment 118 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay. I have heard the noble Lord on the subject of heritage railways many times, and I look forward to hearing him again.

Amendments 114A and 118B are about the role we expect Great British Railways to play in getting people on to rail, given the climate and environmental crises. At the moment, the Bill downgrades the role of the environment, at a time when we absolutely cannot afford to do that. Transport is the UK’s highest polluting sector, and a modal shift duty is an absolute must.

There is a reference in Clause 18 to the effect that railway services have on the environment, but it is a relatively narrow formulation. It is essentially about minimising the harm caused by the railway. We should ask for something much more ambitious: how can the railway itself be a tool in reducing emissions and car dependency, which could have positive cost of living impacts for families and communities, as well as helping us respond to the climate and nature emergencies.

There are demonstrations of what is possible across these islands. Wales has put clear numbers on this. Its transport strategy aims for 45% of journeys to be made by walking, cycling or public transport by 2040. Its net zero Wales commitments include reducing car mileage per person by 10% by 2030, from a 2019 baseline, and increasing journeys by sustainable modes to 39% by 2030.

Scotland has also recognised the importance of reducing car use. It previously set a target to reduce car kilometres by 20% by 2030 from a 2019 baseline. The Scottish Government have since acknowledged that this target is off track and are revising it according to a longer-term target aligned with their climate objectives, but the policy commitment to reduce car use is still there.

There is another important difference. Under Section 44 of the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, Scottish public authorities already have a statutory duty, when exercising their functions, to act in a way best calculated to contribute to Scotland’s climate targets and programmes. But Great British Railways, the Office of Rail and Road, and the Secretary of State will not have an equivalent overarching statutory climate duty under this Bill unless changes such as those proposed here are made. If Scotland and Wales can do this, why not us?

Amendment 127 is on affordability. It is obvious that, if we want people to choose trains over cars and planes, trains have to be affordable. I can cite many examples of where this clearly is not the case. Which? found a return journey from Edinburgh to Bournemouth costing £127 by train—I think I have made that journey, and it is not a great pleasure—compared to £38 by plane. Glasgow to London was £101 by train, compared to £67 by plane. At times, I am sure we could find even worse examples. We cannot seriously expect people to choose rail if it costs two or three times as much as flying.

Affordability is not just about the cheapest ticket you can find online. People have to travel when they need to travel. People on low incomes, shift workers, young people, passengers with disabilities and people living in rural and coastal areas, where there are few alternatives, are often faced with simply impossible costs. We need a clear duty on the Secretary of State and Great British Railways to improve the affordability and fairness of fares, with particular regard to those groups. I therefore explicitly ask the Minister: what is the Government’s ambition for affordable fares under Great British Railways? Will they consider putting that ambition into the Bill?

I come, finally, to Amendments 330K and 334A on the regulation of licences. These are about the relationship between the general duties of the Bill and the licences that will govern the railway. Under the 1993 legislation, licence conditions must have regard to the general duties. These amendments would make sure that this same connection is carried throughout the Bill. As I understand it, with the way the Bill is currently drawn, that link is being removed. This seems important, because the Bill gives us a set of general duties for Great British Railways, but then the licensing framework is no longer required to have regard to them. What will guide the conditions that are put on the licence if the Government are indeed taking away this duty? That is another direct question to the Minister. More broadly, where do these general duties sit in the hierarchy? If they are not reflected in the licences, while competition law and other regulatory requirements continue to have strong legal force, the duties could become more of a statement of intent than something that shapes how the railway is regulated. I beg to move.

Clause 19: Safety duty of Ministers and ORR

Amendment 131 moved by Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

131: Clause 19, page 11, line 31, insert—

“(aa) the exercise by Great British Railways of its statutory functions, and”

Member’s explanatory statement: This amendment adds Great British Railways to the parties with safety duties under Clause 19.

My speech: what a pleasure it is to be back on the Railways Bill with a dozen transport nerds. It is such a wonderful way to spend my Monday evening. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, that I have been talking about climate change for 38 years, and I am barely closer to what I was talking about at the very beginning.

I have Amendments 131, 132, 144 and 338 in this group. I want to explore the tension between safety and competition in the Bill. As the Railways Bill retains the competition law framework established during privatisation—in fact, it extends it further—we can call it the ultimate legal framework for the entire Bill. The concerns go beyond the duty to promote competition. Under Section 67(3) of the Railways Act 1993, the Office of Rail and Road has significant powers to enforce competition law alongside the Competition and Markets Authority. These are much stronger powers than simply encouraging competition.

The problem is that the Bill gives these competition functions priority over several other responsibilities, including the ORR’s general duties and, in some circumstances, its safety duties. It also limits the guidance that UK and Scottish Ministers can give the ORR on competition matters. In effect, competition regulation is being given priority over wider public interest decisions and democratic oversight, and we have to ask whether that is appropriate for a publicly-owned railway. Why should we carry forward and even extend a competition framework inherited from privatisation rather than putting the public interest at the centre of how our railways operate?

There is some reassurance in the fact that safety functions are protected in several of these provisions, but that does not resolve every potential conflict between safety and competition regulation. Wherever those responsibilities could pull in different directions the Government need to explain how that conflict will be resolved and why competition should ever take precedence over safety. That is my Amendment 131.

On Amendment 132, the new safety duty on Ministers and the ORR in Clause 19 is quite shocking: they

“must take into account the need to protect all persons from dangers arising from the operation of railways”.

This clearly has an exemption for competition regulation, which can only mean that, in a trade-off between competition and public safety, competition will win. That exemption should be struck, and we need a proper explanation of why it is present in the first place.

Clause 19’s safety duty does not currently apply to GBR, only to the ORR and Ministers. I would like to know the reason for that. Is it also in any way competition related? Amendment 131 would explicitly add Great British Railways to the safety duty in Clause 19 so that it applied not just to Ministers and the ORR. As we move to a new rail structure, it should be clear that Great British Railways has a responsibility to put safety first when carrying out its functions. It is difficult to see why decisions about competition should be exempt from a duty that exists to protect passengers and railway workers. Competition decisions can have wider consequences for how the railway operates, and safety has to be part of those considerations.

More broadly, I am concerned that the Bill gives too much weight to competition rather than putting public interest at the core of our railways. The purpose of our rail network should be to provide safe, reliable and well-integrated services for passengers, not to create more opportunities for commercial operators.

On Amendment 144, ultimately the ORR’s safety function should be above all other duties. This is a railway, one of the most potentially dangerous industries there is. It is not satisfactory even if safety is formally equivalent to competition. Rather, safety must take precedence over competition regulation. That is why Amendment 144 proposes a priority of safety functions clause, ensuring that there cannot be a trade-off between competition and the safety of the public and rail workers under any circumstances and that this parity is made clear and distinct in law. Taken together, these amendments would strengthen the safety duties on Great British Railways and the ORR and make clear that safety must come first.

Public ownership has to be about more than just changing who runs our railways. It should mean putting passengers, railway workers and public interest ahead of competition. That is why I have called for Clause 20 to be removed from the Bill. We do not believe that a statutory duty to promote competition belongs in this Bill. It puts competition at the centre of the regulator’s responsibilities rather than focusing on what passengers need from their railway. Plus, there is already too little in this Bill about tackling the climate crisis and making rail travel affordable. We should be looking at how to get more people on to public transport, reduce reliance on cars and make sure that taking the train is a realistic option for people on ordinary incomes. Those should be central priorities for our railway.

On to Amendment 338, there is the question of the status of the ORR’s safety duties under the Deregulation Act 2015, inserted by the Economic Growth (Regulatory Functions) Order 2017. This is not mentioned in the Bill as it stands, but this probing amendment suggests that the ORR be removed from that order. The reason is not, in this case, anti-growth. It is because, as few people seem to be aware, it relates to the ORR’s safety function specifically requiring it to consider the importance of exercising the regulatory function in a way which ensures that

“regulatory function is taken only when it is needed, and … any action taken is proportionate”.

Although this, in itself, does not override safety duties, it is clearly intended to influence decisions about what to investigate, when to intervene and whether to use formal enforcement. It is fair to say that it fundamentally has the effect of putting safety enforcement below competition regulation in a hierarchical sense. I beg to move.

Public Office Bill Committee Stage Day 1

Published on by jonesjb

My speech to my amendments on the first day of committee stage: I have six amendments in this group and will speak first on five of them—Amendments 64, 65, 67, 69 and 140. The purpose of these is to clarify which functions of higher education providers fall within the scope of Schedule 2, so that there is greater certainty about where the duty of candour and accountability apply.

The Government have acknowledged that universities perform public functions, including teaching and awarding degrees, but their position leaves important questions about the boundaries of those functions to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. What about activities such as student welfare and pastoral support, safeguarding, accommodation, complaints and appeals, or the way that universities respond to serious incidents? These are a big part of what universities do, and the decisions they make can have a huge and lasting impact on students’ lives.

These amendments spell out exactly which of universities’ activities I am talking about; they cover admissions and assessment, academic progression and disciplinary processes, student support and welfare, safeguarding, accommodation, complaints and appeals, and responses to serious incidents, including student deaths and subsequent investigations. These amendments seek to give us a clearer picture of which university activities should count as public functions and would help ensure that the right standards of openness and accountability apply.

The importance of this question becomes painfully clear when we hear from families who have lost a child while they were at university. A parent who contacted me through ForThe100 told me that their son died by suicide in April 2022, just four hours after the university had informed him that a restriction it had already imposed upon him had been escalated to a complete ban from campus. The family had not known that he was facing disciplinary action. After his death, the parent described to me a long and difficult process of seeking answers, including the struggle to obtain information and get the university to answer their questions properly. Even after the inquest, their attempts to obtain a full response to their concerns continued for a further 18 months. Families should not have to spend years seeking information, answers and accountability while they are already dealing with an unimaginable loss.

The National Review of Higher Education Student Suicide Deaths, published in 2025, recorded concerns from families about transparency, communication and their involvement in investigations. It recommended a duty of candour tailored to higher education, and those concerns underline why we need to be clear about the responsibilities that apply when universities make decisions around students’ welfare and respond to serious incidents.

A government letter of 1 September recognises that some university activities are public functions, but it leaves just too many questions about the other important areas. It does not make clear how the ethical conduct requirements in Chapter 2 are intended to apply to universities. These amendments would help to clear that up. They would give universities, students and their families a clearer understanding of where these responsibilities lie, while still allowing individual circumstances to be considered.

If there are concerns that extending these provisions to higher education would mean that universities become responsible for providing healthcare or guaranteeing every student’s safety, I can reassure your Lordships that this is not what these amendments are about. There is an important difference between a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent harm and a duty to be open and honest about what happened if something goes wrong. The Bill’s duty of candour and assistance is about openness and co-operation in the inquiries and the investigations it covers; it means being prepared to explain what an institution knew, what it did and why.

I will put four specific questions to the Minister, reflecting concerns raised by families through ForThe100 on the Government’s intended treatment of higher education. Do the Government consider pastoral support, student welfare, safeguarding and university-arranged accommodation to be activities forming part of the provision of higher education? Does that extend to academic disciplinary processes, student complaints and appeals, and responses to serious incidents including student deaths? If these are public functions, is there a reason that they should not be expressly identified in Schedule 2, rather than leaving the boundaries to case-by-case judicial interpretation? How do the Government aim to ensure that Chapter 2, on ethical requirements, applies to the relevant public functions of higher education providers? I would really like the Government to explain how the Bill will operate where a university’s activities involve both public functions and arrangements with private contractors.

My Amendment 66A moves on to all of your Lordships, because I do not understand why politicians like us should be held to a lower standard of honesty than other public officials. That is what this amendment is about. Why are Members of this House and other UK Parliaments and Assemblies excluded from this new offence of misleading the public? Is it clear enough when the offence applies? The Government have decided that intentionally or recklessly deceiving the public on matters of serious public concern should be a criminal offence for public officials. We are talking about serious deception proved to the criminal standard in court, not making a mistake, getting something wrong or changing your mind. The offence will apply to Ministers, civil servants, police officers, members of the Armed Forces and other public officials, but Members of this House, the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament, Senedd Cymru and the Northern Ireland Assembly are excluded. I simply do not understand why that distinction has been drawn. If the purpose is to improve accountability in public life, should that principle not also extend to this House—to people who actually make laws, scrutinise the Government and speak to the public on matters of national importance?

There is a second issue that this amendment is for: uncertainty about when someone is acting in their official capacity. The Bill makes the offence dependent on a person acting in their capacity as a public official or public authority, but it does not clearly define what that means. People should be able to understand the law before they act. It has been raised that the Law Commission previously warned, in its examination of misconduct in public office, that the meaning of actingin an official capacity was insufficiently clear. The Bill abolishes the common law offence of misconduct in public office because of the uncertainty around it, yet the new offence of misleading the public relies on almost the same language. Should we not be careful not to repeat the very problem that the Bill is meant to address? I was going to talk about the case against Boris Johnson, but I will skip that.

When creating a new criminal offence, should Parliament not seek to provide as much clarity as possible, rather than leave key questions about its scope to be settled by the courts? This amendment would bring Members of this House, the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament, Senedd Cymru and the Northern Ireland Assembly all into the definition of public official for the purposes of duty of candour and the offence of misleading the public. It would apply the principle of accountability to those who make our laws as well as those who implement them.

Secondly, it would protect parliamentary proceedings and political opinion. Nothing said or done in the proceedings of any UK Parliament or legislature could be caught by these offences. The amendment would also expressly protect expressions of honestly held political belief or opinion by Members of those Parliaments and Assemblies, so it is not about restricting debate in Parliament or criminalising political differences; it is about holding politicians to account for serious deception.

Thirdly, it would clarify when certain officeholders are acting in their official capacity and would provide that Members of this House and other UK Parliaments and Assemblies, Ministers and specified mayors are treated as acting in their official role when speaking to the public about matters of serious public concern, while they are still free to express their political views. Communications made in a judicial capacity or concerning solely private life, family life or private business are obviously excluded.

Fourthly, it would clarify what constitutes harm for the purposes of the offence. It would provide that harm can include undermining public confidence in public authorities, public officials, the exercise of public functions or democratic processes. Then it identifies six purposes for which such a communication might be made. It covers situations where deception could have serious consequences, such as misleading the public to justify military action, concealing risks to public safety or misrepresenting how public money is spent.

This is Bill needs clarification. I have a lot of sympathy for almost all the amendments that we have heard today. I urge the Minister and the Government to actually listen and act on what they are hearing. There are difficult questions where criminal law and political speech intersect, but difficulty is not a reason to look away; it is a reason for us to engage, examine the wording carefully and get it right. I support Amendment 66 from Lady Coffey, as well.

Hansard record here: Public Office (Accountability) Bill – Hansard – UK Parliament